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I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the writing on the Kaye, Scholer imbroglio focuses on two
issues. The first issue that has captured the attention of the pundits is
whether Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler really did anything
wrong. To hear its defenders, Kaye, Scholer simply was defending the
interests of an embattled client as zealously as it could.' The firm's
detractors, on the other hand, insist it was involved in an ongoing and
unethical conspiracy to assist a client in violating federal banking regula-
tions.2 Consistent with these concerns, the second issue involves the pol-
icy questions surrounding Kaye, Scholer's culpability in general and the
propriety of the cease-and-desist order freezing the firm's assets in partic-
ular. The concern is that the aggressive actions of the Office of Thrift
Supervision have harmed the attorney-client relationship or that they
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1977, Harvard; J.D. 1982,
Yale.
** Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. A.B. 1973, Princeton; J.D.
1978, Columbia.
1. Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1992), in THE A'rroR-
NEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER KAYE, SCHOLER 396-402 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7009, 1992).
2. Steve France, Just Deserts: Don't Cry for Kaye Scholer, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at 28;
see also Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 68.
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may prevent lawyers from vigorously representing the interests of their
clients.
This Article argues that, at bottom, the Kaye, Scholer case is not
about legal ethics. Notwithstanding rules of professional responsibility,
the underlying source of authority for the OTS' actions was a federal
statute, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act,4 which clearly gives the OTS the authority to do what it did.
Seen in this way, three important observations can be made. First,
the apocalyptic cries from the bar that the attorney-client relationship
has been jeopardized are clearly misplaced. Any new law or principles of
practice established by the Kaye, Scholer affair are limited strictly to the
banking context. Second, the argument that Kaye, Scholer did not vio-
late the rules of professional responsibility appears to be wholly beside
the point. The legal and ethical rules that govern lawyers' ethical con-
duct have their source in either state law or the rules of state bar associa-
tions. Federal law trumps both to the extent there is a conflict. Third,
and most importantly, the legal issues in the Kaye, Scholer case must be
analyzed with reference to the underlying purposes of banking law. In
this respect it has been argued that regulators should impose liability on
"gatekeepers," those "private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct
by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers," 5 and encourage the
activities of "whistleblowers," the parties who disclose misconduct
directly to "enforcement officials or potential victims." 6 As David Wil-
kins observes, the notice of charges against Kaye, Scholer reflects a desire
on the part of the OTC to pursue both strategies.'
However, the critical issue in the Kaye, Scholer case did not involve
gatekeeper liability or whistleblower liability on the part of the lawyers
representing Lincoln. The critical issue was the freeze placed on Kaye,
Scholer's assets. Therefore, it is important to analyze the purposes and
policies behind FIRREA and its grant of authority to the OTS to freeze
the assets of lawyers, accountants, and others who participate in unsafe
3. Edward Brodsky, The Kaye Scholer Case, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 1992, at 1; see also David
Margolick, Lawyers Under Fire: With the U.S. Willing to Go After Law Firms, More Whistle-Blowing
on Clients Is Likely, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1992, at Al.
4. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 187 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp.
III 1991)).
5. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 53, 53 (1986).
6. Id. at 58.
7. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye Scholer, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1160-83 (1993).
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and unsound banking practices. As will be seen, the relevant provisions
of FIRREA authorizing freeze orders like the one imposed on Kaye,
Scholer were designed to accomplish one purpose: to prevent the dissipa-
tion of assets of an insolvent depository institution caused by delays in
closure.
This Article analyzes whether the freeze order imposed on Kaye,
Scholer accomplished this purpose. The issue of freezing Kaye, Scholer's
assets is distinguishable from the issue of whether liability should ulti-
mately attach to Kaye, Scholer's actions. From this perspective, the crit-
ical question is not even whether Kaye, Scholer acted improperly. For
purposes of this discussion, we assume that Kaye, Scholer was in viola-
tion of FIRREA and thus subject to the provisions authorizing the gov-
ernment to freeze its assets. However, the focus of this Article is on the
purposes and policies behind the relevant provisions of FIRREA and on
whether the OTS' actions furthered the goals of the statute.
The first part of this Article reviews the facts of the Kaye, Scholer
case as well as the "spin" placed on those facts by the OTS in its notice of
charges and by commentators evaluating the OTS' actions. The Article
next examines the purposes and policies of FIRREA, focusing particular
attention on the overall goals of the statute as well as on the particular
provisions at issue in the Kaye, Scholer affair. The Article proceeds to
show that the remedies provided by FIRREA are aimed at dealing with
the problems of bank insolvencies, not lawyer misconduct. FIRREA
was not designed to punish lawyers; it was designed to assist regulators in
preserving the assets of insolvent thrift institutions by facilitating the
early closure of such institutions. However, that design is flawed, and in
this Article we show that the freeze mechanism employed by the OTS on
Kaye, Scholer is not likely to achieve Congress' objectives. We explore
alternative policies that are better suited to meeting these objectives.
Finally, this Article examines Congress' objective of early closure.
While early closure is a reasonable policy objective, it is not a panacea for
the problems facing the banking industry. In order to deal effectively
with them it is critical that Congress impose structural reforms that
address the core problems that have caused the banking crisis: insuffi-
cient diversification, excessive risk taking, and bad management. Seen
against the backdrop of the mammoth problems facing the banking
industry and the need for meaningful solutions, the Kaye, Scholer case
can be viewed for what it really is: mere political maneuvering by regula-
tors more interested in placating a restless public than in implementing
the difficult reform programs necessary to save the industry.
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II. THE FACTS AND THE SPIN
From the perspective of bank regulatory policy, clearly the single
most critical fact in the Kaye, Scholer case is the precise date that Lin-
coln became insolvent. If a public policy favoring early closure is to be
implemented, then banking regulators must be able to identify insolvent
financial institutions and close them in a timely manner.
A. THE TIMING OF KAYE, SCHOLER'S INVOLVEMENT
Charles Keating's American Continental Corporation acquired Lin-
coln Savings and Loan Association in February 1984.1 The critical
examination that brought Lincoln's problems to the surface was begun in
January 1986 by the San Francisco office of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, the agency that initially reviewed Lincoln's financial well-
being. This examination ultimately resulted in a highly critical report of
examination on Lincoln.9 However, the Bank Board did not release this
report until April 1987.10 While impossible to determine the exact date,
it seems clear that Lincoln had been insolvent for a very long time prior
to the release of the 1986 report of examination. Indeed, it appears likely
that Lincoln was insolvent as early as March 1986, if not much earlier.11
Yet there was not a determination of insolvency until May 1987, when
the San Francisco office of the FHLBB recommended that Lincoln be
placed in conservatorship/receivership. 12 Moreover, Lincoln did not
retain Kaye, Scholer as its counsel until June 1986.13 Thus, the inelucta-
ble facts are as follows: (1) By the time Kaye, Scholer became involved in
the FHLBB's 1986 examination of Lincoln, the financial institution was
already insolvent, and (2) the FHLBB knew of Lincoln's insolvency at
least as early as April 1987. Yet the institution was not seized until April
1989, and the OTS did not sue Kaye, Scholer until March 1992.
8. Robert E. O'Malley, Chronology of Key Events, in ATTORNEYS' LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC'Y,
THE KAYE, SCHOLER CASE AND OTHER SELECTED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND ETHICS ISSUES
13 (Robert E. O'Malley et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter KAYE, SCHOLER CASE].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation began its regular examination of
Lincoln in January 1986 and started a special examination in March. It stands to reason that the
special examination was begun because of acute concern on the part of regulators regarding Lin-
coln's insolvency.
12. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Recommendation and Statement of Supervisory
Concerns (May 1, 1987), cited in Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 921 n.31
(D.D.C. 1990).
13. O'Malley, supra note 8, at 13.
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These facts make it clear that bureaucratic timidity and ineptitude,
rather than Kaye, Scholer's machinations, are primarily to blame for the
unconscionable delays in closing Lincoln. At the very latest, Lincoln
should have been closed in May 1987, when the FHLBB finally deter-
mined that Lincoln was insolvent. That the institution was not closed
until April 1989 can hardly be blamed on Kaye, Scholer. And if Kaye,
Scholer's actions did not delay the seizure of Lincoln, then the firm's
actions did not harm taxpayers or upset the basic purposes of the under-
lying regulatory scheme.
Of course, just because Lincoln already was insolvent at the time
Kaye, Scholer came onto the scene does not mean that the firm's aggres-
sive activities on the part of its client did not make things worse. In fact,
Kaye, Scholer's activities could have dramatically increased the costs of
the Lincoln bailout by postponing the closure of that institution and
thereby allowing losses to mount. On the other hand, it must be empha-
sized that Kaye, Scholer's aggressive lawyering was not all that pre-
vented the timely closure of Lincoln.
While Keating worked with his attorneys at Kaye, Scholer, he also
lobbied hard in Washington to ensure that Lincoln would be treated with
kid gloves by regulators.14 Indeed, it is clear that Keating's lobbying
efforts were surprisingly successful. The five U.S. Senators who became
known as the "Keating Five" interceded on behalf of Lincoln with fed-
eral regulators in April 1987.15 And by May 1988, Keating also had
succeeded in having jurisdiction over the investigation transferred to
Washington from the FHLBB's San Francisco office.
Thus, in analyzing the extent of the damages caused by Kaye,
Scholer's involvement in this affair, it is important not to give it too
much credit or blame. After all, the firm might have been responsible for
some of the delay in closure, but it is impossible to avoid the conclusion
that most of the delay can be attributed to Keating's deft maneuvering in
political circles-his generosity to politicians and other influential peo-
ple-and to old-fashioned bureaucratic ineptitude and trepidation.
To reach any conclusions about how much of the delay in closing
Lincoln was a result of Kaye, Scholer's activities, it is important to
understand what the firm actually did. The section that follows reviews
the charges against Kaye, Scholer for the purpose of determining how
successful the firm was in buying time for Lincoln. In the final analysis,
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id.
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one's assessment of the benefits of pursuing Kaye, Scholer rests on
assumptions about the marginal costs of its improper behavior. Put
another way, nobody disagrees with the proposition that if Kaye, Scholer
had acted with perfect propriety under any standard, it still could have
succeeded in obtaining at least some delay for Lincoln. Seen from this
perspective, the relevant inquiry is how much additional time and tax-
payer money were wasted as a result of Kaye, Scholer's improper
activities.
B. KAYE, SCHOLER'S CONDUCT
Reading the notice of charges brought by the OTS against Peter
Fishbein and Kaye, Scholer, it appears that members of the firm were
involved in an ongoing criminal conspiracy to conceal illegal practices at
Lincoln, ACC, and other corporations controlled by Keating.16 The
notice of charges articulates what appears to be an ironclad argument
that Kaye, Scholer "knowingly or recklessly participated" in a violation
of the law or in an unsafe or unsound banking practice in violation of
FIRREA
1 7
Apologists for Kaye, Scholer take one of two tacks. First, following
Geoffrey Hazard's well-known (and well-remunerated) argument that
Kaye, Scholer did not violate existing standards of ethical conduct, some
argue that the relationship between attorneys and clients would be dam-
aged if Kaye, Scholer were punished.18 Alternatively, and more persua-
sively, others argue that Kaye, Scholer's due process rights may have
been violated by the extraordinary unilateral power that the statute gives
to the OTS to make the factual determinations necessary to support the
sort of asset freeze used against Kaye, Scholer, and then to impose such a
freeze without any outside authority (such as a judge) ruling on the pro-
priety of the action. 9 Professor John C. Coffee has made a powerful
argument that the procedures invoked by the regulators in the Kaye,
Scholer affair give rise to serious constitutional questions regarding the
prehearing deprivation of property imposed on several Kaye, Scholer
partners.2 °
All in all, the response of the legal community was to circle the
wagons round the campfire and praise the valiant attempts of Kaye,
16. See generally id. (considering the charges as a whole substantiates our claim).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(C)(ii) (1988).
18. See Daniel Wise, OTS's "Harball Tactic" Decried by Bar, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 1992, at 1.
19. See Brodsky, supra note 3, at 1.
20. John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Process for Kaye, Scholer?, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1992, at 22.
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Scholer and its senior partner, Peter Fishbein, to resist the government's
attempts to destroy the adversarial system of justice in the United States.
With regard to Fishbein, a lead story in the Wall Street Journal "painted
a vivid picture of a proud warrior, leader of a proud law firm, forced by
brutal government tactics to 'fall on his sword' rather than fight to
defend his honor and the ancient ideal of 'unstinting loyalty to the
client.' "21
Alternatively, supporters of the government's actions are quick to
point out that in representing Lincoln, Kaye, Scholer was not acting as
would a typical firm with a typical case. In a famous letter from Fishbein
to B.J. Davis, Director of Examinations for the FHLBB, Fishbein asked
that the Bank Board refrain from requesting documents or information
about Lincoln from Lincoln itself and instead send such requests directly
to Kaye, Scholer.22 Some have argued that this put Kaye, Scholer in a
difficult position in its attempts to provide legal advice to Lincoln. In
particular, the firm became vulnerable to the charge that Fishbein had
"interposed Kaye, Scholer between Lincoln and the FHLBB with respect
to all factual matters"23 and thereby became an institution-affiliated
party, obligated to refrain from making false or misleading factual state-
ments or omissions to regulators.24 The firm potentially had become
obligated to comply with federal regulations and to prevent Keating from
abusing and looting Lincoln.25
This is a pretty weak argument. Kaye, Scholer's serving as a
clearinghouse for incoming document requests does not seem so unusual,
especially given that the FHLBB had hired outside counsel. It is by no
means obvious why serving as a clearinghouse for documents sent to a
client by a regulatory agency should increase a law firm's culpability for
the information and documents that go from the client to the agency.
After all, it would seem to make no difference whether requests for docu-
ments and information went directly to Kaye, Scholer or were routed to
the firm by the client. Moreover, if one examines Kaye, Scholer's request
from the perspective of the underlying purposes of FIRREA, it appears
that Kaye, Scholer simply was trying to expedite the review process by
providing a centralized clearinghouse for the FHLBB's document
21. France, supra note 2, at 28.
22. Letter from Peter Fishbein, Senior Partner, Kaye, Scholer, to B.J. Davis, Director of
Examinations, FHLBB (July 15, 1986) (on file with author).
23. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 45 (Dep't Treasury 1992) (Mar. 1 notice of charges
against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler and three partners).
24. France, supra note 2.
25. Id.
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requests. Indeed, Fishbein's infamous letter of July 15, 1986, to the
FHLBB in San Francisco made it clear that he wanted the examination
speeded up, not slowed down.
But the OTS charges were not without substance. Most of the
charges consisted of allegations that Kaye, Scholer either knowingly
made misrepresentations or omitted facts material to Lincoln's financial
status and activities. This was the essence of eight of the ten claims in
the OTS notice of charges.26 The other two claims concerned (1) the
quality of the advice Kaye, Scholer provided to Lincoln, and (2) Kaye,
Scholer's reckless failure to fulfill its fiduciary duties to Lincoln and its
"unethical and improper professional conduct."27
C. CLAIM ONE: THE QUALITY OF KAYE, SCHOLER'S ADVICE
Perhaps the most serious charge concerned whether Kaye, Scholer
knowingly disregarded material facts when it advised Lincoln that its
direct investments were legally grandfathered. On January 30, 1985, the
FHLBB issued a final rule on direct investments by insured thrift institu-
tions.28 Under this rule, thrifts that held more than ten percent of their
assets in direct investments were prohibited from making any further
direct investments without the approval of the FHLBB.29 However, this
so-called direct investment rule contained a grandfather clause that per-
mitted direct investments for which there was a "legal commitment"
before December 10, 1984.30 The grandfather clause also permitted
thrifts to complete projects pursuant to definitive plans in existence on
that date.31
Kaye, Scholer advised Lincoln that $750 million in direct invest-
ments was legally grandfathered under the direct investment rule.
According to the OTS, Kaye, Scholer knew that the Lincoln board of
directors had not taken the steps necessary to approve the direct invest-
ments, and thereby make them "definitive plans," before the deadline.32
The OTS argued that Kaye, Scholer also knew that the Lincoln board of
directors had backdated the approvals necessary to authorize the
26. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, claims 2, 3, 5-10 (dealing directly with these issues).
27. These allegations are the subjects of id. claim 1 and id. claim 5, respectively.
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-8 (expired Jan. 1, 1987, by terms of sunset provision).
29. Id. § 563.9-8(C)(2).
30. Id. § 563.9-8(0.
31. Id.
32. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, paras. 28, 32.
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grandfathered investments to make them appear as if they had been com-
pleted before December 10.33 The OTS also claimed that Kaye, Scholer
knew that Lincoln relied on these backdated documents as evidence of
the "definitive plans" that permitted grandfathered direct investments.34
On the basis of these facts, the OTS claimed in its notice of charges
that Kaye, Scholer recklessly provided legal advice to Lincoln in disre-
gard of Lincoln's backdating of the documents.35 The OTS did not sug-
gest that Kaye, Scholer was obliged to blow the whistle on Lincoln about
the backdating. Rather, the OTS argued only that Kaye, Scholer should
have advised Lincoln that it was acting illegally.36 But suppose that
Kaye, Scholer did what the OTS wanted it to have done. That is, sup-
pose Kaye, Scholer had advised Lincoln that for certain of its direct
investments it was not entitled to the exemptions from restrictions. Is it
clear that Lincoln would have refrained from making these investments?
Certainly not. Rather, judging from Lincoln's behavior in other con-
texts, it seems clear that Lincoln would have continued to make these
investments. And even if it had refrained from making the investments,
it seems clear that the money would have been wasted by Lincoln in
some other way. Thus, Lincoln's backdating may have been unlawful,
but Kaye, Scholer's conduct in the backdating affair probably did not
raise the marginal costs of the bailout by an appreciable amount.
D. THE DISCLOSURE CLAIMS: Two, THREE, AND
FIVE THROUGH TEN
In what may be its best-known allegation, the OTS argued that
Kaye, Scholer failed to disclose to the OTS the real reason that Arthur
Andersen & Co. resigned as Lincoln's independent auditor in late 1986. 37
The OTS contended that Arthur Andersen resigned because Lincoln was
too risky.38 Kaye, Scholer reported to the FHLBB on an SEC Form 8-K
that Arthur Andersen's resignation "was not the result of any concern by
[Arthur Andersen] with [Lincoln's] operations.., or asset/liability man-
agement."' 39 A careful review of the facts indicates that Kaye, Scholer
was not acting improperly, at least in this context. Arthur Andersen
33. Id. paras. 32-33, 35.
34. Id. para. 28 (claim 1).
35. Id. para. 35(a).
36. Id. para. 183.
37. Id. paras. 41-42.
38. Id.
39. SEC Form 8-K (Oct. 1, 1986), quoted in Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp.
901, 921 (D.D.C. 1990).
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resigned because it was concerned that Lincoln's extremely aggressive
business practices, while legal, would disturb regulators.' This was dis-
closed by Kaye, Scholer in the Form 8-K. The document specifically
said that Lincoln's rate of growth and asset mix were likely to be of con-
cern to regulators and that this bothered the accounting firm, particu-
larly "in view of the very litigious environment controlled to a large
degree by regulators."4  In other words, because the omissions did not
concern any information not already known to regulators, it does not
appear that Kaye, Scholer failed to disclose any material fact relating to
the resignation of Arthur Andersen.
Several of Kaye, Scholer's other alleged misrepresentations and
omissions deserve attention here as well. These allegations, which are
summarized in the OTS' third claim and detailed in claims five through
ten, essentially charge that Kaye, Scholer falsified or omitted to disclose
material facts that would have demonstrated that Lincoln was in weak
financial condition. In its fifth claim the OTS charged that Kaye, Scholer
misrepresented certain real estate transactions in which Lincoln had
either (1) overstated the prices for which such real estate was sold, (2)
fabricated records for property sales that never took place, or (3) engaged
in swaps, known as "linked" transactions, in which Lincoln purchased
property at artificially inflated prices on the condition that the seller
agree to buy other property from Lincoln at artificially inflated prices.42
Kaye, Scholer was not charged with participating in these fraudulent
practices, but rather with having knowledge of these practices and failing
to report the information to the OTS. 3
Even assuming that the allegations were true, something about these
charges still doesn't make sense. The OTS admitted in the fifth claim
that "[a]s a result of the 1986 Examination, the examiners determined
that as of September 30, 1986, Lincoln's regulatory net worth was sub-
stantially less that [sic] its required minimum due to adjustments to Lin-
coln's income that the examiners deemed necessary."'  The fifth claim
also made clear that any misrepresentations by Kaye, Scholer did not
occur until the summer of 1987." Thus, the OTS appears to have admit-
ted that it was not fooled by Kaye, Scholer's misrepresentations, at least
with respect to the matters at issue in its fifth claim. As was suggested
40. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 39.
41. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 39.
42. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 64.
43. Id. paras. 66, 71.
44. Id. para. 58 (claim 5) (emphasis added).
45. Id. paras. 62, 63.
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earlier, if regulators knew in September 1986 that Lincoln was insolvent
in general and that its regulatory net worth was substantially less than
the required minimum, the institution should have been closed then, not
in April 1989.46 It is impossible to escape the conclusion that something
besides Kaye, Scholer's aggressive lawyering and alleged misdeeds kept
Lincoln open long after it should have been closed.
Kaye, Scholer also was charged with failing to disclose facts about
Lincoln's underwriting practices and about the documentation of its
loans.47 Specifically, the OTS charged that adverse documents were
removed and favorable documents added to Kaye, Scholer's loan file and
that Kaye, Scholer knew of deficiencies in Lincoln's loan files.48
These charges appear to go to the heart of the Kaye, Scholer matter
because the misrepresentations and omissions would have impeded the
efforts of regulators to determine the quality of Lincoln's loan portfolio.
However, on closer inspection these charges appear to be among the
more ambiguous of the allegations against Kaye, Scholer. The charge
that Kaye, Scholer added and subtracted documents must be read in
light of the Kaye, Scholer internal memorandum stating that "prior to
the [1986] Board Examination, ACC's [sic, actually Lincoln's] loan files
ran the spectrum from disaster to non-existent. Before the [FHLBB]
examination began, [Arthur] Andersen sent in a team of five people to
assemble the fies and get underwriting data."4 9
The OTS characterized Lincoln's activities as an attempt "to mask
the deficiencies in its underwriting files." 50 But another way of charac-
terizing Lincoln's efforts (or at least the efforts of Kaye, Scholer and
Arthur Andersen) is as an attempt to improve the quality of these files in
order to bring them into compliance with the applicable regulations.
Seen in this way, Kaye, Scholer's knowledge of certain deficiencies in
Lincoln's loan fies is far from nefarious. Clearly, one salutary role that
banking lawyers and accountants can play is to bring loan files into regu-
latory compliance.
It appears certain that Lincoln thought that some of the steps
required to bring loans into compliance with applicable regulations were
a waste of time. Obviously, Lincoln made a lot of bad loans. Lincoln
46. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
47. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 75 (claim 6).
48. Id. para. 76.
49. Id. claim 6 (quoting internal Kaye, Scholer memorandum (Aug. 1988)).
50. Id. para. 77.
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prepared loan underwriting "summaries," which were memoranda cre-
ated after the fact (that is, after loans had already been made) in order to
bring the loan files into regulatory compliance by providing necessary
information about the feasibility of the loans made.5 The regulators
concluded that the "repayment analysis" contained in these summaries
(which purported to analyze the borrowers' ability to repay the loans)
was not based on any independent information and was otherwise
unreliable.5 2
The OTS appears to have concluded that these documents were
unreliable on their face. Perhaps this was so. And perhaps Kaye,
Scholer acted improperly. But if this was the case, it is hard to see what
harm was done given that the regulators were not fooled by what Kaye,
Scholer did. In fact, Kaye, Scholer admitted that there were deficiencies
in Lincoln's documentation. Its defense was that Lincoln's fies did not
"reflect the full extent of the underwriting process" and that "the
number of loans cited as having documentation deficiencies is
overstated."s
3
At times the sixth claim in the OTS notice of charges appears to be
trying to have it both ways. It criticizes Kaye, Scholer for failing to pro-
vide independent verification for loan files54 and for having investment
files prepared after the fact, "in some cases by outside accountants at
Lincoln's request." 5 In the portion of the sixth claim that accuses Kaye,
Scholer of knowingly omitting material facts, the OTS provided excerpts
of a Kaye, Scholer internal memorandum in which one of the firm's law-
yers was directed to speak to Andre Niebling, Lincoln's president, about
how to "show Lincoln's underwriting in its best possible light."56 This
suggests that Kaye, Scholer was trying to remain within the bounds of
truthful disclosure. After all, depicting something in its most favorable
light is much different from depicting something in a false light.
The seventh claim in the notice of charges relates to the direct
investment issue. It charged that Kaye, Scholer knew that several trans-
actions between Lincoln and the Wolfswinkel Group that were charac-
terized as loans were really direct investments because they were joint
ventures between Lincoln and Conley Wolfswinkel, the owner of the
51. Id. para. 84.
52. Id. para. 85.
53. See KAYE, SCHOLER CASE, supra note 8, at 51 (citing response of Kaye, Scholer to the
1986 examination (June 26, 1987)).
54. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 85.
55. Id. para. 95.
56. See KAYE, SCHOLER CASE, supra note 8, at 52.
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Wolfswinkel Group.17 Moreover, it charged Kaye, Scholer with know-
ing that Conley Wolfswinkel did not have sufficient resources to meet his
personal obligations to Lincoln in connection with the guarantees he had
made on Lincoln's investments in the Wolfswinkel Group. 8 Here the
arguments are clearly and unambiguously consistent with the overall
import of the OTS' notice of charges. Kaye, Scholer appears to have
tried to muddy the waters for the regulators by allowing Lincoln's
accountants to base their conclusions about Lincoln's relationship with
Wolfswinkel on false assumptions about Conley Wolfswinkel's financial
status and Lincoln's management of properties owned by the Wolf-
swinkel Group. However, Kaye, Scholer was not alleged to have had
this information until late August 1986, a bare month before the regula-
tors knew Lincoln was insolvent. 9 Thus, while Kaye, Scholer may have
aided and abetted Lincoln in its misrepresentations and omissions to
lawmakers, it is not obvious what real harm was caused by the firm's
obstructionist activities given that the regulators would know Lincoln
was insolvent one month later.
The eighth claim in the notice of charges relates to the same under-
lying problem that is the subject of the first claim, the grandfathering of
certain of Lincoln's direct investments. In particular, this claim alleged
that Kaye, Scholer failed to disclose to the OTS that certain documents
were backdated. ° Such backdating was critical to Lincoln's attempts to
have these investments grandfathered. Kaye, Scholer's response to this
charge was that the date of the documents was immaterial because what
mattered was the date on which the relevant decision took place, not the
date of the documents. 61 This is an extremely weak argument. Obvi-
ously, people put dates on documents for a reason. With respect to
transactional documents, there is a presumption that the dates on the
documents correspond to the dates on which the decisions memorialized
therein were made. Thus the OTS was correct in its assessment that
Kaye, Scholer should have disclosed this backdating to the OTS.
However, in a careful analysis of the Kaye, Scholer affair, it is
important to put Kaye, Scholer's professional lapses in perspective.
Clearly, Kaye, Scholer's cover-up of Lincoln's backdating was a serious
breach of professional standards, including the FHLBB's prohibition
57. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 107.
58. Id. para. 133.
59. Id. paras. 113-16.
60. Id. para. 149.
61. Id. para. 142.
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against engaging "in any dilatory, obstructionist, egregious, contemptu-
ous, contumacious or other unethical or improper professional conduct
before the Board."62 But how much harm did this breach cause the
FHLBB's regulatory effort? The actual investments made by Lincoln
were not hidden from the FHLBB. Nor did Kaye, Scholer conceal that
Lincoln's investments were direct investments rather than loans. All
that was concealed was the date on which Lincoln committed itself to
make these investments. 63 For technical regulatory reasons Lincoln
wanted to make it appear to the FHLBB that it had committed to these
investments earlier than it actually had."4 The regulators should have
made a determination of the safety and soundness of these investments
regardless of when Lincoln had committed to them. Thus, it is not at all
clear how the backdating that is the subject of the first and seventh of the
OTS' claims impeded the FHLBB's basic objective of evaluating Lin-
coln's financial condition.
The ninth claim in the OTS notice of charges pertains to Lincoln's
participation in the financing of a personal tax shelter for Charles Keat-
ing and other investors in Lincoln's holding company, American Conti-
nental Corporation. Lincoln's funding of this tax shelter was illegal
because the tax shelter vehicle, an entity called the Hotel Ponchartrain
Limited Partnership, was an affiliate of Lincoln. 65 Hence, loans from
Lincoln to the limited partnership involved conflicts of interest and were
prohibited as affiliated transactions. But as with certain of the other
claims made by the OTS, the critical issue is when Kaye, Scholer knew
that false and misleading information was being supplied by Lincoln to
the FHLBB.
Here it appears that the critical date is October 18, 1988, the date of
an internal Kaye, Scholer memorandum in which the firm conceded that
it was "disingenuous to fail to deduct management fees, real estate taxes
and similar items on computing the appropriate profit particularly when
the relevant figures are so easily obtainable. ' 66 But prior to that, on Sep-
tember 6, 1988, a joint examination of files from Lincoln's holding com-
pany conducted by the FHLBB and the California Department of
Savings and Loan concluded that the $20 million extension of credit
from a Lincoln subsidiary to the Hotel Ponchartrain Limited Partnership
62. At the time of the Kaye, Scholer affair, these prohibitions were listed in 12 C.F.R.
§ 513.4(a)(3) (1986).
63. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 28.
64. Id. para. 24.
65. Id. para. 159.
66. Id. para. 167 (quoting Kaye, Scholer memorandum (Oct. 18, 1988)).
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was a "loss, unsafe and unsound, and [a] flagrant conflict of interest. 67
Thus, Kaye, Scholer was not as effective as the OTS would have people
believe, nor were the regulators as easily duped. Again, the point is not
to apologize for Kaye, Scholer or to portray its actions as anything other
than egregious. Rather, the point is to suggest that factors other than
Kaye, Scholer's misconduct account for the failure by regulators to close
Lincoln in a timely fashion.
As part of its tenth claim against Kaye, Scholer, the OTS questioned
a transaction between Lincoln and a partner in Kaye, Scholer named
Lynn Toby Fisher. Fisher received a $675,000 loan from Lincoln,
secured by a mortgage on real estate appraised at $700,000 and a pledge
of securities.68 At the time, she was serving as securities counsel for Lin-
coln's holding company, with responsibility for preparing and reviewing
the prospectuses filed by Lincoln and its holding company with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the FHLBB.69 It is hard to
know exactly what to make of this claim. It is not unreasonable for a
lending institution to make a fully collateralized $675,000 loan to a part-
ner at a major New York law firm. Nor does it appear that any federal
regulations were violated in this transaction. However, the OTS claimed
that the transaction between Fisher and Lincoln violated 12 C.F.R.
§ 513(a)(4),70 which permits the FHLBB, after providing notice and the
opportunity for a hearing, to deny lawyers the privilege to practice before
it if they have "willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
tion of, any provision of the laws administered by the Board or the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder.
' 71
E. KAYE, SCHOLER'S FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO LINCOLN: THE
FOURTH CLAIM
Perhaps the most controversial claim brought by the OTS against
Kaye, Scholer is the fourth claim, in which the firm was accused of fail-
ing to fulfill its fiduciary duties to Lincoln and of engaging in unethical
and improper professional conduct. The premise behind this charge is
that Kaye, Scholer knew of the "high risk nature of Lincoln's real estate
development business," of the deficiencies in Lincoln's real estate under-
writing and appraisal business, of Lincoln's efforts to conceal its viola-
tions of the limitations on direct investment, of transactions between
67. Id. para. 164.
68. Id. paras. 172, 176.
69. Id. para. 178.
70. Ia para. 181.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 513.4(a)(4) (1986).
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Lincoln and its affiliates that were unfair to Lincoln, and of a variety of
problems with Lincoln's real estate business.72
Despite a complete absence of support in law or established practice
or procedure,7 3 the OTS claimed that Lincoln owed fiduciary duties to its
depositors and to the deposit insurance fund and that Kaye, Scholer was
at fault for failing to advise Lincoln that it was in violation of these
duties.74 Harris Weinstein, Chief Counsel to the OTS at the time it
brought charges against Kaye, Scholer, invented the idea that thrift
directors owe fiduciary duties to federally administered deposit insurance
funds. In a series of well-publicized speeches, Weinstein argued that
directors of federally insured financial institutions
are not legally free to view themselves as having duties only to com-
mon shareholders. So truncated a view would result in a complete
disregard of the duty owed to the true party in interest. The reason is
that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the federal government,
whose interest in the institution exceeds that of any other person, and
who insures the deposits, holds the unlimited equity risk, and is the
primary creditor in insolvency.
75
In addition to having no basis in law, the OTS' claim that thrift
directors owe fiduciary duties to the deposit insurance fund had no basis
in established agency practice and was of questionable merit as a policy
matter. Under the circumstances, it is nothing short of incredible for the
OTS to argue that Kaye, Scholer was not rendering competent legal
advice when it failed to advise the Lincoln directors of legal obligations
that, in fact, did not really exist.
The charges by the OTS that Kaye, Scholer knew that officers and
directors of Lincoln were violating federal regulations have only slightly
more merit. If anything in the Lincoln case is clear, it is that these
officers and directors were aware that they were violating such regula-
tions. That is why they were ultimately prosecuted by the authorities.
Indeed, if key directors and officers of Lincoln had not thought they were
violating federal banking regulations, they never would have hired Kaye,
Scholer in the first place. Thus, it is a bit disingenuous for the OTS to
charge that Kaye, Scholer was obligated to tell its client something that
the client already knew.
72. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 53.
73. Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like Money in the Bank? An Economic Analysis of Fiduciary Duties
to Protect the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 355, 358 (1992).
74. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 54.
75. Harris Weinstein, OTS Chief Counsel, Remarks at Southern Methodist University (Sept.
13, 1990), quoted in Nussbaum, supra note 73, at 383.
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Finally, the OTS' fourth claim charged that Kaye, Scholer knew
that the interests of its client ACC were adverse to those of another of its
clients, namely, Lincoln. Kaye, Scholer was charged with failing to
advise these clients of its conflict of interest or, alternatively, failing to
seek the consent of Lincoln's board to represent both ACC and Lin-
coln.76 This claim ignores two critical facts about Kaye, Scholer's joint
representation of ACC and Lincoln. The first is that ACC owned 100%
of Lincoln's stock.77 ACC's complete ownership of Lincoln necessarily
meant that what was good for Lincoln was good for ACC, and vice
versa. Second, the OTS ignored that, unlike in most conflict-of-interest
situations, both of Kaye, Scholer's clients were fully aware of the firm's
double representation. Consequently, it is far from clear that disclosure
was necessary under the circumstances.
F. THE CLAIMS AGAINST KAYE, SCHOLER: SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the preceding discussion is not to defend Kaye,
Scholer. Rather, our purpose is to provide better understanding of the
marginal benefit of the Kaye, Scholer prosecution from the perspective of
bank regulatory policy. Thus, we wish to emphasize that we do not dis-
pute that Kaye, Scholer did something wrong and that the firm probably
should have been sanctioned for what it did. For example, Kaye
Scholer's cover-up of Lincoln's backdated documents78 was a breach of
professional standards, as were the firm's misrepresentations regarding
Lincoln's financial condition.79
Having said that, however, it also is worth emphasizing that the
prosecution of Kaye, Scholer did nothing to improve the safety and
soundness of the nation's banking system or to improve the quality of
regulatory oversight received by federally insured financial institutions.
From the perspective of bank regulatory policy, the critical issues are as
follows: (1) whether the sort of enforcement action brought by the OTS
against Kaye, Scholer will result in more soundly managed federally
insured financial institutions, and (2) whether this sort of enforcement
action is likely to provide regulators with information about the financial
condition of troubled depository institutions in a more timely manner.
76. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, para. 56.
77. Id. para. 4.
78. See supra text accompanying note 43.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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The preceding discussion should have made clear that the enforcement
action against Kaye, Scholer is unlikely to produce these sorts of results.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Kaye, Scholer affair is
that the federal banking regulators were aware of Lincoln's insolvency
even before most of Kaye, Scholer's wrongdoing occurred. Even in those
instances when Kaye, Scholer assisted Lincoln prior to the regulators'
learning of Lincoln's insolvency, the regulators were already aware of the
particular problems that the firm may have attempted to obfuscate. For
example, the claim that Kaye, Scholer assisted Lincoln in presenting
incomplete or inadequate files to regulators is hardly a claim that the
firm hid things from the regulators with the effect of delaying the discov-
ery of Lincoln's insolvency. Thus, the argument that Kaye, Scholer's
actions somehow enabled Lincoln to remain open after it was insolvent is
false.
With respect to the remaining allegations against Kaye, Scholer, the
preceding analysis indicates that some of Lincoln's activities did not
require the involvement of lawyers in the first place. In particular, while
Kaye, Scholer was aware that Lincoln backdated certain documents in
order to increase its direct investments, there was no allegation that the
law firm participated or assisted in such backdating. Thus, it seems clear
that the backdating would have occurred without Kaye, Scholer's
involvement. Indeed, without Kaye, Scholer's involvement, the backdat-
ing probably never would have been detected.
III. FIRREA, REGULATORY SUBTERFUGE, AND THE REAL
REASON KAYE, SCHOLER WAS PURSUED
BY THE OTS
The preceding discussion was intended to show that the prosecution
of Kaye, Scholer did not improve the quality of the bank regulatory sys-
tem because even if Kaye, Scholer had acted in precisely the manner
demanded by the regulators and had not engaged in any improper con-
duct, the price tag for Lincoln's failure would have remained the same:
$2 billion. In other words, while Kaye, Scholer may have acted improp-
erly, its actions did not delay the closure of Lincoln. Thus, the publicity
surrounding the Kaye, Scholer case has obscured the most important
policy question: What really caused the delay in closing Lincoln?
Locating the cause of the delay in closing Lincoln is important
because delays in closing federally insured depository institutions are
extremely costly. When dealing with insolvent banks, good timing by
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regulators is critical to controlling costs. In fact, at some level virtually
all of the losses to deposit insurance funds can be attributed to bad timing
on the part of regulators. After all, if a depository institution could be
closed at the exact moment of insolvency (i.e., at the moment when the
present value of the troubled bank's assets exactly equals the present
value of its liabilities),"0 the losses to the deposit insurance fund would be
zero.
Moreover, delays in closing failed financial institutions dramatically
increase the losses suffered by fixed claimants, including the FDIC:
[I]f a failed bank remains open after it is economically insolvent, the
shareholders, who have nothing more to lose if the bank continues its
downhill slide, have a strong incentive to "roll the dice one more time"
or, in other words, to take extremely high risks in hope of a huge pay-
off that will restore the value of their equity."1
Unfortunately, the decision to close an insolvent bank rests with banking
regulators, who do not personally internalize the costs of delay. Regula-
tors who prematurely close a solvent financial institution will offend the
shareholders, managers, employees, and depositors of that institution.
But regulators who permit an insolvent financial institution to remain
open after it should be closed rarely are blamed because the costs of
keeping such institutions open are widely dispersed among taxpayers,
who must provide the funds necessary to bail out the deposit insurance
funds.
And, if one examines the peculiar incentives facing banking regula-
tors, one finds that there are strong incentives for regulators to delay
closing insolvent financial institutions. In fact, banking regulators have
strong incentives to delay identifying problem banks, to deny the severity
of the banking crisis generally, and to postpone meaningful action for as
long as possible regardless of the cost.
Regulators are not residual claimants. They do not benefit by saving
money in the resolution process. Moreover, federally sponsored deposit
insurance creates a situation in which bank depositors, who constitute
what is by far the largest group of bank creditors, are deprived of any
reason to become concerned about bank solvency. The banking crisis,
even though it has reached epic proportions, still is not a major political
issue. Candidates for major office can avoid it because the public, made
80. Liabilities include the sums owed to depositors (including those that are federally insured)
and the administrative costs of the insolvency itself.
81. Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1277,
1294 (1989).
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rationally ignorant by federal deposit insurance, has not forced them to
confront the issue.
Another factor that influences regulators' incentives is that they
have short-term horizons. They often do not expect to stay in their job
for very long, 2 and they are evaluated on the basis of a bizarre set of
criteria. The FDIC is generally thought to have performed well if the
number of bank failures in any given year is small, if the size of the
deposit insurance fund does not shrink during a particular period, and if
the taxpayers are not called upon to ante up money to assist in the
bailout. These criteria create a set of overwhelming incentives for regula-
tors to delay recognition of a crisis by keeping insolvent institutions oper-
ating and by avoiding liquidations of insolvent institutions. Regulators
are willing to accept huge long-term losses rather than face relatively
small short-term losses because their incentive system allows them to
pass the political consequences of long-term losses onto subsequent regu-
lators. This is a natural and inevitable consequence of the fact that the
deposit insurance fund has no residual claimants.
When Congress enacted FIRREA in 1989, it recognized that insol-
vent depository institutions must be closed in a more timely manner.
Unfortunately, Congress did not seem to recognize that the perverse
incentives facing bank regulators made such regulators part of the prob-
lem rather than part of the solution. Thus, FIRREA reflects the flawed
assumption that giving bank regulators more power and greater access to
information will lower the costs of administering the nation's failing
banks by insuring that such banks are closed in a more timely fashion.
FIRREA gave the newly created OTS additional authority to pro-
mulgate a variety of capital requirements for thrifts,8 3 and it gave the
FDIC broad new powers to conduct special examinations of thrifts84 and
to appoint receivers for state-chartered, federally insured thrifts.8 5 In all
likelihood the reason the FDIC was given particularly broad powers to
appoint receivers for state-chartered thrifts was that Congress thought
82. Political appointees are generally removed when administrations change, and the higher
pay offered by private-sector employers causes rapid turnover among political appointees as well.
Jonathan R. Macey, It's Time for Bush to Pay the Piper on the S&L Bailout, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1990.
83. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301(S)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 302 (1989) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1990)).
84. Id. § 210(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)).
85. Id. § 212 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)-(j)).
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that state regulators had incentives to keep insolvent financial institutions
open in order to benefit local interests at national expense.8 6
Unfortunately, when Congress enacted FIRREA, it apparently did
not recognize that federal regulators have incentives to keep insolvent
institutions open as well. FIRREA attempts to ensure that regulators
will be able to effectuate the early closure of insured depository institu-
tions by imposing stiff penalties for institutions that fail to make reports
to bank regulatory agencies or that file false or misleading reports with
such agencies.
8 7
FIRREA also recognizes that early closure may not be enough in
some circumstances. Early closure may not be enough because, even
under the best circumstances, regulators need time to assemble sufficient
evidence to permit them to close an insured depository institution. As
Professor Coffee has observed, much of FIRREA is best understood as a
reflection of "congressional concern about delay in the closing of an
insolvent institution until legally adequate evidence could be gath-
ered.... [M]inutes count in such a fast-moving context when financial
assets can disappear without a trace."
88
It was for this reason that FIRREA gave the OTS the extraordinary
power to issue cease-and-desist orders, not only against insured deposi-
tory institutions, but also against "institution-affiliated parties," such as
lawyers and accountants. 9 However, it is not at all clear that FIRREA
can be read to permit the actions taken by the OTS against Kaye,
Scholer. The relevant provisions of the statute make it clear that direc-
tors, officers, consultants, attorneys, appraisers, and accountants face the
prospect of a freeze order only for engaging in activities that are likely to
result in adverse effects on insured financial institutions.' The critical
section of the U.S. Code provides,
[W]herever the violation or threatened violation or the unsafe or
unsound practice or practices ... or the continuation thereof, is likely
to cause insolvency or significant dissipation of earnings of the deposi-
tory institution, or is likely to weaken the condition of the depository
institution or otherwise prejudice the interests of its depositors.., the
86. The perverse incentives of state bank regulators have been well documented. See
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 129 (1992);
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 677 (1988).
87. § 301(u)(4)-(8), 103 Stat. at 312 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(v)(4)-(8)).
88. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 22.
89. § 901, 103 Stat. at 446 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1786(r) (Supp. 1989).
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agency may issue a temporary order requiring the depository institu-
tion or such party to cease and desist from any such violation or prac-
tice and to take affirmative action to prevent or remedy such
insolvency, dissipation, condition, or prejudice pending completion of
such proceedings.
9 1
Lincoln was seized by the FDIC in April 1989. The OTS did not
bring suit against Kaye, Scholer until March 1992. Thus, by the time
Kaye, Scholer was sued, the firm's actions could no longer be said to be
"likely to cause insolvency or significant dissipation of earnings" of Lin-
coln or "to weaken the condition" of Lincoln or "to otherwise prejudice
the interests of its depositors" within the meaning of the statute.
Thus, it appears that the OTS may have lacked statutory authority
to freeze the assets of Kaye, Scholer when it did. At best, the agency's
authority to issue the order was unclear. One begins to wonder why the
agency decided to issue the freeze order in the first place. Earlier we
showed that regulators have strong incentives to delay the closing of
insured financial institutions even though the public suffers mightily from
such delays.92 These perverse incentives go a long way toward explain-
ing why the regulators took so long to close Lincoln. The political pres-
sures applied by Charles Keating, who hired lobbyists and enlisted the
help of at least five U.S. Senators, complete the picture.
The delay in closing Lincoln is one issue; the extraordinary actions
taken against Kaye, Scholer almost three years later are quite another.
To understand the motivations of the OTS, one must recognize the polit-
ical environment at the OTS and its predecessor agency, the FHLBB.
First, even before FIRREA was enacted, the FHLBB was viewed as a
failed administrative agency, corrupt at worst and at best riddled with
conflicts of interest and wholly captured by the industry it was supposed
to regulate. 93 For this reason the FHLBB was abolished and its func-
tions were divided among the FDIC and two newly created entities, the
Resolution Trust Corporation and the OTS.9 4
Second, FIRREA, which was heralded as a major legislative tri-
umph for the Bush Administration, quickly came to be viewed as a major
failure. FIRREA denied the severity of the crisis, did nothing to correct
bureaucratic incentives that failed to ensure that depository institutions
91. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
93. Jonathan R. Macey, The Politics of Denying an S&L Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1989, at
M3.
94. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 86, at 35.
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would be closed in a timely fashion, and perpetuated the flaws in the
pricing of FDIC insurance that led to the crisis in the first place.95 The
newly created OTS and RTC quickly became mired in controversy.
The reputation of the OTS was doomed from the start because it
was forced by powerful special interests in Congress to accept as its
Chairman the infamous M. Danny Wall, the inept Chairman of the
FHLBB.96 Wall was widely considered to have behaved in an ethically
questionable manner because the outrageously low estimates of the costs
of the savings and loan bailout issued by him in 1988 were perceived to
have been contrived to help George Bush win the 1988 presidential elec-
tion.97 More to the point, as head of the FHLBB, Wall sided with
Charles Keating in the dispute between Keating and the examiners from
the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank over auditors' recommen-
dations about Lincoln's investment portfolio. In this dispute, Wall not
only interfered with the actions of the local regulators and sided against
his colleagues at the FHLBB, he also ultimately took the unprecedented
step of removing the San Francisco regulators and transferring regula-
tory authority over Lincoln to Washington, D.C.98 This act on behalf of
the politically well-connected Keating delayed Lincoln's closure by
almost two years and cost taxpayers literally billions of dollars. 99
By the time the OTS took regulatory action against Kaye, Scholer,
blame for the banking crisis had shifted. In the early days of the crisis,
many believed that fraud, incompetence, and corruption within the bank-
ing industry were to blame."° But by 1991, it was clear to all that the
regulatory system itself was at fault. The fact that regulators were
unable or unwilling to detect $500 billion in losses and the virtual bank-
ruptcy of the entire industry could not be blamed solely on incompetence
and corruption within the savings and loan institutions.
The passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act10 1 in November 1991 provides some evidence of how disreputa-
ble the bank regulatory agencies had become by the time the enforcement





100. Some estimate that fraud and self-dealing have been "apparent" in as many as one third of
today's bank failures. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1153, 1166 (1988).
101. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 141, 105 Stat. 2236, 2273 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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action was brought against Kaye, Scholer in March 1992. For the first
time, Congress recognized that the federal bank regulatory agencies were
handling bank failures ineptly and were not closing insolvent institutions
in a timely manner. Thus the FDICIA was designed to remove regula-
tory discretion from the agencies with respect to the issue of how to deal
with insolvent financial institutions. The agencies were given even
clearer instructions about early closure and about what procedure to use
in handling insolvent institutions.
Before the Act was passed, the FDIC could resolve failed banks in
any manner it wanted, so long as the strategy it employed was no more
costly than liquidating the bank by directly paying depositors the amount
of their insured deposits and then disposing of the bank's assets.'02
Under the FDICIA, however, the FDIC is required to resolve failed
depository institutions in the manner that is the least costly "of all possi-
ble methods for meeting the corporation's obligations" ' 3 (unless there is
a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
the President, that the least costly strategy would "have serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability")."° Moreover, in a
move clearly designed to deprive the FDIC of unfettered discretion, it is
now required to provide documentation of its resolution decisions.105
In light of all of this background, the real purpose behind the Kaye,
Scholer enforcement action seems clear. The OTS-under new and con-
siderably more competent management than its predecessor, the
FHLBB-needed a convenient, unpopular scapegoat that it could con-
front with a dramatic gesture designed to help it regain its prestige. In
this context, the selection of Kaye, Scholer was nothing short of brilliant.
By focusing attention on the law firm's representation of Keating and
Lincoln, the agency was able to purge the taint caused by the actions of
its former chairman on behalf of Lincoln. Of equal importance, the OTS
enforcement action was carefully designed to create the impression that
the law firm's improprieties, rather than the regulator's own political cor-
ruption and ineptitude, were to blame for the unconscionable delay in
closing Lincoln.
Finally, the OTS managed to improve its image by creating the
impression that the enforcement action against Lincoln represented a
102. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 86, at 279.
103. § 141(a), 105 Stat. at 2273.
104. Id. at 2275.
105. Id. § 131 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 18310(h) (Supp. 1991)). The Act added the
documentation requirement to § 38(h) of the former FDIA.
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great victory for a small bureaucracy in its holy war against the large,
well-funded Goliaths of the legal profession. By targeting lawyers, the
OTS managed to do battle with a group even less popular than itself and
to create the impression that it was not to blame for the continuing crisis
in the banking industry.
IV. TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE CONTINUING CRISIS
Over the past two decades Congress has gradually and grudgingly
become aware that deep and pervasive structural problems plague the
banking industry and that the regulators have played a larger role in
causing the problem than in fashioning a solution. The enactment of
FIRREA in 1989 reflects a recognition by Congress that the FHLBB
could not continue to regulate the thrift industry and that the thrift
industry could not continue to postpone acknowledging that the industry
itself was largely defunct.
Nevertheless, the enactment of FIRREA continued the perception
that the regulatory process had failed only because the regulators had
been given too little power. Congress still did not understand that the
problem was not a lack of power but a lack of appropriate incentives.
Thus, while the regulators had sufficient power to close institutions like
Lincoln in a timely fashion, their incentives were to delay closure, not
only to maximize political support from corrupt politicians like the Keat-
ing Five but also to maintain the appearance of regulatory success by
keeping the enormous size of the crisis hidden from public view.
The passage of the FDICIA was a strong signal that Congress
finally recognized that regulators were not prepared to deal with the
problems of the banking industry on their own. Thus, while FIRREA
attempted to deal with the problems by expanding regulatory power,
FDICIA attempted to deal with these problems by reducing agency dis-
cretion. It did this in a number of ways: most notably, by compelling
the FDIC to implement risk-based deposit insurance premiums on
insured depository institutions, by attempting to reduce agency discre-
tion of how to administer bank failures, and by requiring the agencies to
impose new restrictions on banks that failed to meet capital guidelines.
The OTS' aggressive actions against Kaye, Scholer should be viewed
as a rational response by an administrative agency to a new political envi-
ronment in Congress. For a time the bank administrative agencies coop-
erated with Congress in its efforts to postpone recognition of the banking
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crisis in general and Lincoln's failure in particular. But when public sen-
timent turned against Congress, a scapegoat was needed, and the OTS
found one in Kaye, Scholer. In other words, somebody had to take the
blame for the outrageous delay in closing Lincoln. The real culprits, of
course, were members of Congress, particularly the Keating Five, and
regulators, such as Danny Wall, who succumbed to political pressure
and agreed to delay closing Lincoln long after it had become insolvent.
Above all, however, it was the perverse structure of incentives embodied
in federal banking law that was to blame.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the shift from the regulatory discretion model of
FIRREA to the command-and-control model of FDICIA will improve
the way financial institutions in the United States are regulated. The
banking industry is too complex and the nature of the decisions required
of regulators too subjective to permit a centrally planned, command-and-
control strategy to succeed. For example, as explained earlier, it is clear
that if banks could be closed at the exact moment when they become
insolvent, then bank failures would not be the public burden they are
today. But the decision to close a bank is inevitably subjective. It
involves immensely complicated judgments about the quality of a bank's
assets that simply cannot be reduced to regulatory generality.
Thus, the command-and-control model reflected in FDICIA is no
improvement over the broad delegation model of FIRREA. Instead of
meaningful reform, we get highly publicized events like the prosecution
of Kaye, Scholer. The only alternative to the broad delegation model of
FIRREA and the command-and-control model of FDICIA is a market
model in which industry participants themselves are induced by market
forces to manage banks prudently.
Under the current system two sorts of perverse incentives exist.
First, regulators have perverse incentives to deny and obfuscate the
severity of the banking crisis and to avoid meaningful solutions to the
ongoing problems in the industry by shifting the blame for the industry's
problems to entities like Kaye, Scholer. Second, market forces are not
allowed to supplement the regulatory system's efforts to prevent exces-
sive risk taking by banks. In particular, deposit insurance creates a per-
verse incentive for bank shareholders to use their control to cause banks
to engage in increasingly risky activities in order to transfer wealth from
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creditors, depositors, and, ultimately, the deposit insurance fund itself to
themselves, shareholders of FDIC-insured banks.l"
While fixed claimants, such as depositors, always face the prospect
that shareholders will attempt to transfer wealth away from them by
increasing the riskiness of the firms in which they have invested ex post
(that is, after the fixed claimants have made their initial investments),
[w]hat makes banks fundamentally different from other types of firms
... is the lack of significant discipline from other fixed claimants.
FDIC insurance removes any incentive that insured depositors have to
control excessive risk taking because their funds are protected regard-
less of the outcomes of the investment strategies that the banks select.
In a world without deposit insurance, depositors would demand that
banks refrain from engaging in risky investment strategies or else
would demand that they be compensated in the form of a higher inter-
est rate for the extra risk.
10 7
Thus, under the current system of bank regulation, not only do reg-
ulators lack incentives to deal with the problems facing the industry, but
market forces are not operating, either. For market forces to be brought
to bear on the crisis, three things must happen:
First, assuming the continuance of the deposit insurance system,
banks that offer federally insured deposit accounts must pay insurance
premiums that are set by market forces rather than by regulators. The
FDICIA requires risk-based deposit insurance premiums, but it allows
bank regulators to set those premiums."10 Those regulators have neither
the capacity nor the incentives to determine what premiums to charge.
Instead, banks should be offered a menu of alternative market-pricing
mechanisms for their deposit insurance. One option, suggested by Pro-
fessor Kenneth Scott of Stanford Law School1° 9 and, independently,
Douglas Evanoff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 110 would be to
allow insured depository institutions to sell uninsured, unsecured
subordinated debentures in the capital markets and to tie a bank's insur-
ance premiums to the interest rates applied by the markets to these
debentures. Alternatively, other banks, particularly smaller banks lack-
ing ready access to the capital markets, could obtain private coinsurance
106. Macey & Miller, supra note 100, at 1165.
107. Id.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992).
109. Kenneth Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW.
907 (1989).
110. Douglas Evanoff, Subordinated Debt: The Overloaded Solution for Banking, CHI. FED.
LETTER, May 1991, at 1.
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from insurance companies or consortiums of fellow banks. The rates set
by these private insurers or consortiums could be used to set the price
charged by the government for FDIC insurance. Market-based premi-
ums for deposit insurance would provide banks with a strong incentive to
engage in prudent banking practices because they could not continue to
pass the costs of engaging in risky activities on to the government. As of
now, banks like Lincoln can engage in excessively risky activities, know-
ing that their shareholders will capture all the gains in the event of suc-
cess while the costs of failure will be borne largely by taxpayers.
Second, banks must be required to balance their insured deposits by
keeping uninsured debentures or uninsured depository accounts in
amounts equal in face value to their insured deposits. Allowing these
debenture holders and uninsured depositors to force insolvent banks into
bankruptcy would ensure that all insured depository institutions were
continuously monitored by a group of investors with strong incentives to
ensure prompt closure in the event of insolvency.
Finally, shareholders should be given expanded incentives to run
their banks safely and soundly. Prior to the introduction of federally
sponsored deposit insurance in the 1930s, bank shareholders faced
double liability to depositors in the event of insolvency.1 1  Under that
system, if a bank failed, the receiver of the failed bank would determine
the extent of the insolvency and then assess shareholders an amount up
to and including the par value of their stock. This system of double lia-
bility transformed bank shareholders from investors seeking to gain
advantage by increasing the riskiness of their banks to investors who ben-
efited by decreasing the riskiness of those firms.112
The great irony behind the OTS enforcement action against Kaye,
Scholer is that the reason Congress gave the OTS such broad enforce-
ment power was to enable it to act quickly to prevent the dissipation of
assets of insolvent financial institutions. By the time the OTS began to
use this power, however, Congress had finally come to recognize that
giving the OTS and other bank regulatory agencies broad enforcement
powers was not the solution to the problem. The OTS action against
Kaye, Scholer, coming almost three years after Lincoln had been shut
down, proved that Congress was right.
111. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and
Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992).
112. Id. at 33.
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The enforcement action against Kaye, Scholer was a desperate, and
ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by the OTS to shift blame for the ongo-
ing crisis in the banking industry and deflect the public's attention from
the regulators' own ineptitude. Unfortunately for the OTS, its actions
against Kaye, Scholer were too little and too late. The FDICIA reflects
Congress' lack of trust in the bank regulatory agencies. Unfortunately,
the centrally planned, command-and-control model reflected in FDICIA
is not an improvement over the broad delegation strategy embraced by
FIRREA. Perhaps Congress will turn to a market-based solution while
there is still an industry left to regulate.
HeinOnline -- 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 1992-1993
HeinOnline -- 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1144 1992-1993
